MANN v. ORIENTAL MILL CO.

carried on the business of a mercer with his wife, part of the time
in St. Ann's Square. By his will, after certain devises, &c., the
real estate was devised in remainder to the right heirs of the tes-tator. A bill was filed by one of the co-heiresses-at-law of
Wareing, asking for a general administration of his estate, and
also that the good-will of the business in St. Anne's Square should
be sold and the proceeds secured for the beneficiaries under the
will. It appeared that Eleanor Wareing, before she married the
testator, had carried on the busineis of a milliner and dressmaking, and continued to do this after her marriage, independently
of her husband, who merely kept the books. At the time of
," Wareing's death the business of dressmaking had been carried
on for some years on the premises in St. Ann's Square, under the
name of Ellen Wareing. The success of the business was independent of location. Mrs. Wareing continued the business after
her husband's death, and finally sold the good-will for a considerable sum. Held, by Lord ROMILLY, M. R., that the good-will of
the dressmaking business belonged to the widow, as she could not
have been prevented after the death of her husband from carrying
on the business. It is to be noticed that in this case Mrs. Wareing retired from the business on selling the good-will, and that it
would probably have had but little if any value if she had continued to pursue the business.
A. S. BIDDLE.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of lhode Island.
MANN v. ORIENTAL MILL CO.
The rule whereby a servant is precluded from indemnity against injury caused
by the negligence of a fellow-servant, only extends to the ordinary employment of
the servant. If the servant is ordered by a superior servant to do a dangerous
act out of his ordinary course, whereby he suffers damage, the master will be responsible.
CASE for damages resulting from an accident to plaintiff while
in the employment of defendant.
Plaintiff was employed as a fireman to tend the fire in an engine
in the defendants' mill. At the trial evidence was offered tending
to show that when employed he was given to understand he was
to obey the orders of the engineer. The engineer called on him
to assist in throwing on a belt, which was used to operate the
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pump which filled the boiler, and in doing this he suffered the
injury complained of.
He had several times before been called on to d'o the same thing,
but there was evidence that at this time there was a peculiar
danger, from the condition of the belt and the speed of the machinery.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
POTTER, J.-The defendants claimed that they were not liable:
1st. Because the engineer and plaintiff were fellow-servants, and
there was no evidence that the engineer was an incompetent
person.
2. That there was a belt-fixer, or person especially employed
to fix the belts in the mill, and that it was not the business of the
engineer or within his department.
The first objection is that the judge charged that if the engineer
was the plaintiff's superior, and had a right to give orders in his
department which the plaintiff was instructed to obey, the case
would not come within the principle regulating liability of employer
in case of negligence of a fellow-servant; and the superior must
in this regard be looked upon as representing the employer, and
if the employer would have been liable if the orders had been given
directly by him, he would be liable if they were thus indirectly
given through the engineer.
It is objected, secondly, that, by way of illustration, the judge
referred to the case of a farmer setting a servant to clean a well:
if the well was in ordinary order, the laborer could judge of the
danger as well as the employer, but if the well was so defectively
built as to be peculiarly dangerous, and the employer gave no
warning of it, he might be liable in case of accident.
And the judge further said that if this fireman was suddenly
called on to perform a dangerous service, not strictly within the
line of his duty and requiring peculiar skill, there would be no presumption that he knew the risks of it: and if so, he should not
have been directed to do it without information of the nature of
the service and risk.
Thirdly: It is objected that the judge refused to charge the
jury that there was no cause of action set forth in the plaintiff's
declaration.
And fourthly: The defendants' counsel requested the judge to
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charge that if there was a regular belt-fixer, and the plaintiff knew,
it, and he was employed merely as a fireman, then if the engineer
gave him an order to shift the belt, it would be out of the line of
his duty, and the defendants would not be liable.
But the judge charged that if he was instructed not to obey the
engineer out of the line of his employment, and he chose to do so,
he could not hold the defendants liable; but that thcre was no
evidence that he was so .instructed, but so far as the evidence went
it was the other way, and that in the absence of such instructions
the engineer would be authorized to call upon any one under him
in another capacity to assist (the engineer) in any matter within
his (the engineer's) department: and if he did, the defendants
would be liable, even if there was another person who might more
properly be called upon; but that if the throwing on and off
of the belts was not within the engineer's department but was confined by the corporation to a belt-fixer, the defendants would not be
liable.
We have been referred to decided cases, showing the general rule
that the master is not responsible to a servant for injuries resulting
from the negligence of a fellow-servant employed in the same general business. And the rule is the same if the servants are engaged
in different departments.
So also if the negligent servant was in a superior station, provided the fact of such superiority is not an element in causing the
injury, i. e., if the injury might as well have happened if lie had
not been superior.
So also if the person injured was subject to and at the time
obeying the orders of the superior negligent servant, the master
would not necessarily be liable if the injured person was at the
time acting under the superior in a branch of business for which
he was specially employed and the risks and dangers of which he
may be presumed to be acquainted with. In such a case his
knowledge of the danger would be considered in estimating the
degree of care he should use to avoid it.
These rules however are subject to certain well understood exceptions growing out of the duty of the master to select proper
servants and provide proper machinery.
In the present case the jury were told substantially and we
think rightly, that if the fireman altlough employed only for a
fireman, was placed under the orders of the engineer and was by
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him suddenly called upon to assist in throwing on a belt, out of
his own sphere, but within the sphere of duty of the engineer,
.and was thus subjected to a risk with which he was not acquainted,
or to a peculiar and greater risk at that time, and of which he
was not informed or cautioned, then the defendants would be
liable.
And we think the jury were rightly told that if the fireman was
placed under the engineer as his superior, and this superior had a
right to give orders in his department, the case did not come
within the principle regulating liability in cases of fellow-servants,
and that the engineer must be looked upon as representing the
employer.
If the person here injured had been an inferior servant and had
been injured by the negligence of a superior servant in the same
department, e. g., if he had been placed under a superior fireman
by whose neglect he had been injured, the case would have been
different. And it might then be argued that he must have known
and calculated the risks of such employment.
In the present case the fireman was not injured while working
in his own particular department, but was injured by the neglect
of a superior whose department was more extensive, including his
(the fire) as a part of it. The engineer not only had a delegated
authority or control, but it was the exercise of this delegated authority which was the cause of the injury.
And there were several points in the present case, such as the
being suddenly called upon, and the want of opportunity to examine and estimate the danger, which have in the reported cases
been allowed considerable weight in deciding upon the question of
liability.
The third exception was not relied upon in argument, and as to
the fourth we think the charge correct.
We think therefore the exceptions cannot be sustained and the
motion for new trial is denied.
The foregoing opinion, upon a most
embarrassing question, will not fail to
commend itself to all lovers of justice.
But from that large class of the profession who, from habit or education,,
look first for symmetry, and thin for
justice, it may possibly encounter some
distrust, but is nevertheless sound, we

believe. There is, in our judgment, no
topic of the common law more beset
with doubt and perple\ity than this one,
of the exact responsibility of the master
for injuries to his servant, through
some act of a fellow-servant, or some
defect of machinery unknown to the
master. If the fellow-servant, through
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whose act the damage accrues is incompetent, to the knowledge of the master,
and not understood to be so by the other
servants, or if lie was employed without
proper precaution, and proved incompetent, whereby a fellow-servant suffers
damage, or if the servant is injured, in
consequence of acting under the direction of a servant of superior grade,
and in some department out of the general employment of the servant thus injured, the cases seem to agree the
master is responsible. Railway v. .Jackson, 55 Il1. 492, where a freight brakeman was thrown from the train and
killed, in aftempting to descend a ladder,
which proved defective, in obedience
to the order of his superior, in order to
change a switch, a matter not within
the range of his ordinary employment.
But if the loss of life had accrued, in
consequence of the train running off the
track, by reason of the displacement of
the switch, it would have been a case
within the ordinary range of the duty
of a fellow-servant, and there could
have been no recovery against the master: Tinno'y v. R ilway, 62 Barb. 218.
And Huddleston v. L. M. Ship, 106
Mass. 282, is a case of the same class
with Railway v. Jackson, supra. There
are other cases of the same character:
Frostv. Union Pacific Railway, 11 Am,
Law Reg. N. S. 101 ; Chicago Railway
v. Honmey, 28 Ind. 23. So also if one
is injured through defects in the engine
he is put to drive, of which he had no
knowledge, the master will be held responsible: Evans v. Fitchburg Railway,
I I Mass. 142; Columbus 4- C. Railway v. Arnold, 31 Ind. 174.
So that the present rule seems to be,
that the servant is only excluded from
obtaining compensation of the master,
for such damage accruing through the
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neglect of fellow-servants, or defects
of machinery, as arose in the regular
cause of his employment, and where
there was nothing to mislead him as to
the true nature of the perils by which
he was surrounded. As to these ordinary and constant perils, by which
all servants will be beset, in all employments, and which it is impossible
effectually to guard against, by any
reasonable and ordinary degree of vigilance on the part of the master, it is
deemed more reasonable, and a better
policy, that the servant should run his
own risk. Such position will afford
motive for greater diligence and watchfulness on the part of the servant, and
will, at the same time, prompt him to
exercise proper watchfulness over his
fellow-servants, to secure both competency and faithfulness on their part.
These seem to be the only grounds upon
which any such exceptional rule, as the
one we are considering, can be justified,
and there seems no good reason to extend such an exceptional rule beyond
the requirements of the principle of
policy upon which it is founded. Most
of the cases will be found in the chapter
which we have devoted to the subject,
in our Railways, vol. 1, pp. 543, et
seq., 131. There are some very extreme cases to which we need not refer.
In Railway v. Harrison, 48 Miss. 112,
the conductor compelled a mere stranger
boy, standing by, to uncouple the cars,
whereby he suffered damage, and the
recovery against the master -was denied.
And the mere fact that the servant acts
under the orders of his superior will
not, commonly, render the master responsible: Falthan v. England, L. R.
2 Q. B. 33. See also Railway v.
Drowney, 17 Ohio N. S. 147.
I. F. R.

JOHNSON v. HACKER.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.
WILLIAM JOHNSON ET AL. V. NEWTON IACKER.
A special act of the legislature, giving time to a particular tax collector to collect and account for the taxes, operates to release his sureties.
BILL in equity. Complainants were sureties of David Fry, as
tax collector for Greene county. On the 26th of April 1866, the
legislature passed an act allowing Fry the further time of six
months to collect and account for the taxes. The question raised
by the bill was whether this extension of time to the tax collector
released his sureties?
The opinion of the court was delivered by
NIcHOLSON, 0. J.-As between individuals, it is well settled that
whenever the right of the principal to sue is, for the time, gone,
so that if he sued, the principal debtor could set up the contract
against him successfully as a defence, then he can equally set up the
defence against the surety claiming to be substituted to the creditor's
right. This makes it necessary that it should be a binding and
obligatory contract, capable of being enforced. A mere gratuitous
indulgence, or promise of indulgence, being nudum pactum, nor
capable of enforcement, has no such effect: 9 Yerg. 32; 3 Hum.
412. It is insisted that upon these principles the sureties of Fry
were not released by the extension of time given to him by th-e
legislature, because the sureties had the right, notwithstanding the
legislative act giving time, to pay the debt and sue the principal
debtor. But could the sureties sue the principal successfully?
Would not the legislative act of indulgence preclude the sureties
from collecting the debt from the principal debtor ? This must
depend upon. the legal effect of the legislative act. If it has the
force and effect to protect the principal debtor against suit by the
state, then of course it would protect the principal debtor from
suit by his sureties. - The Attorney-General says that "a private
act to give indulgence to a state debtor is not in the nature of a
partial law, but a mere business direction. Legislation of a.general
character, for the government of the people, is essentially different
from laws to administer the revenue. The one must needs be general for the protection of the people; the other must needs be
applied to the particular case, and be, in many instances, restricted
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to one case, one payment, &c., And further: "Then a particular law giving indulgence must be construed as a law touching the
officers of the state-those whom she has a right to control by
partial laws-not td a particular man or men, whom she has no
right to direct, except by general laws." In another part of his
argument the Attorney-General, after stating that the state is not
bound by a voluntary direction given to its officers, says: "It is
only directory to the officers of the state. They are precluded
from suit; the surety is not." We-understand from all this that
the Attorney-General concedes that the act giving time to Fry may
be valid as a business direction ; that it operates upon the officers
of the state whose business it is to collect the revenue; that these
officers are precluded from suing by the act giving indulgence. But
he insists that the state itself is not bound not to sue, and hence
there was no suspension of her right. It results, if this argument
is sound, that the legislature precluded the Comptroller and
Attorney-General from suing Fry during the time of indulgence
given, but yet his sureties were not thereby prevented from suing
him, or compelling the state to sue him, notwithstanding the act
giving time. It is scarcely necessary for us to say, that the sureties
could not prosecute a suit against the state to compel her to sue
the principal debtor. This would be a violation of the familiar
principle, that the sovereign can only be sued with his consent.
Then, could the sureties pay the debt and sue the principal'
debtor ? The legislature ad protected the principal debtor from
suit, by forbidding the Comptroller and Attorney-General and
Circuit Judge to enforce collection by suit. It is conceded by the
Attorney-General that this prohibition is binding on the officers
of the state. The state operates alone through its officers. If
their bands are tied by a valid legislative act, we are unable to
understand how the sureties are to proceed to sue, and collect by
suit from their principal debtor, a debt which the state has forbidden her own officers to collect from him by suit. We understand
that on the subject of revenue the sovereignty of the state is represented by the legislature, and a legislative act is passed which forbids
the officers of the state to sue the debtor of the state. This operates necessarily to protect the debtor from suit, as well by the sureties as by the officers of the state. It is true the state, through
the legislature, may repeal the act of indulgence, but until such
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repeal it is binding, and the state is incapable of enforcing the
debt, except through the repeal of the act by the legislature.
Until such repeal, the suspension of the right to sue is complete,
and the sureties can have no remedy, either against the state or
the principal debtor.
If follows that the legislative indulgence given to Fry. as it was
riot repealed, operated to discharge his sureties. It follows that
the Chancellor's decree overruling the demurrer was correct, and
is affirmed with costs. The cause will be remanded.
McFARLAND, J.,

dissented.

lrhe important question in regard to
the continued responsibility of the surety, where further time is given to the
principal, is, how far the responsibility of
the surety is thereby altered or modified..
It is, perhaps, not important whether as
a question of fact to be determined by
the jury, his position is thereby rendered
essentially worse or not. The surety
is entitled to stand upon the very terms
of his contract, and may insist he will
not be thrown upon any other, even
where a jury might regard them as no
more hazardous or onerous. The obligation of suretyship is unquestionably
one strictissinijuris, and the surety may

insist it shall not be changed in one
iota. By "changed" we mean legally
changed, so that the surety cannot enforce all his rights in the matter, both
as to the principal debt and the creditor,
and his remedies against the principal
debtor for his indemnity, in precisely
the same manner No doubt there are
many merely permissive indulgences
constantly extended to the principal
debtor by the creditor, which may very
seriously impair the ultimate risk of the
surety. But as these are mere omissions of imperfect duties on the part of
the creditor, and which the surety is not
legally bound to regard in his dealing
with the matter, he cannot object, that
his actual legal position is thereby affected.

But in the present case it seems very
obvious that the position of the surety
was not only changed, in that six
months' more time was extended to the
principal debtor in which to perform
his duty, but the risk and responsibility
of the surety was clearly thereby proportionally enhanced. If the principal
debtor thereby legally obtained more
time to perform his duty, as to the creditor, it is difficult to comprehend how
the surety could, upon any fair basis of
argument or construction, be justly said
to be in precisely the same position. No
doubt, as is very common of late, the
extension of time might have been made
subject to the consent of the surety, or
saving all rights of the surety, and thus
have escaped all peril of releasing the
surety. But there is no pretence of
anything of the kind. It seems to us
the case is presented with great fairness
and force in the opinion of the court,
and we need not refer to the decided
cases upon a topic so familiar to the profession. They are given in detail in the
argument of counsel, but we have not
We
space for their insertion here.
give the case because it presents the
question of the obligation of suretyship,
in a new form, and one which the pro
fession will be glad to know of.
I. F. R.

PATTEN v. PATTEN.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
CHARLES W. PATTEN v. MARY J. PATTEN.
In a chancery cause where complex and intricate accounts are to be examined,
they should be referred to a master for examination and re ort before decree, and
not be heard in court except upon specific exceptions taken thereto.
The separate estate of the wife under the statute is a legal estate. And where
such estate comes to the hands of the husband and is used by him with her consent,
the relation of principal and agent is created, and she may compel him by bill to
account to her for such estate.
If tle husband claim tile income of such estate as a gift from the wife, the burden
is upon him to establish his claim by proof.

BILL filed by the wife to compel her husband to account for and
pay over all money coming into his bands out of her separate
estate, and not properly expended for the benefit thereof. The
parties were married in September 1864, and the bill was filed in
March 1871. A decree passed against the husband upon which
he brought this writ of error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
McALLISTER, J.-The subject-matter involves transactions running through many years, numerous and various, constituting complex and intricate accounts. There was no reference to a master,
and we are called upon by the assignment of errors to re-examine
those accounts. This court upon the nature of the matter and the
authority of the case of Daourgv. United States, 7 Peters 625,
has repeatedly held that a complex and intricate account is an
unfit subject for examination in court and ought always to be referred
to a master to be examined by him and reported in order to a final
decree. When that is done specific exceptions can be taken which
may be reviewed in this court. When this court is asked upon
appeal or error to re-examine such an account and the party in
whose favor the decree is rendered, had thus brought it into court
for examination without reference to a master, the decree will be
reversed, with direction to have the reference made, ag was done in
the case just referred to.
Besides the objections to the amount found by the decree, the
counsel for plaintiff in error insists that because these parties were
living together as husband and wife, from their way of dealing
there arises a presumption of consent on her part to the approprianon of her income and proceeds of property by the husband, and
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that she cannot afterwards recall it. The case of Caton v. Bidout,,
1 -11acN. & G. 47, is cited to support that position. Tbere-is
no controversy in this case that the estate out of which the money
or income arose, was the separate estate of the wife, complainant
below, under the Married Woman Act of 1861. In the case of
Caton v. _Ridout, the estate in the wife was an equitable one under
a settlement for her separate use.
We endeavored in the case of Cookson v. Toole, 59
Ills. 515, to
point out some of the distinctions and implications arising therefrom, between the separate estate of the wife as the creature of
equity, and that existing by operation of the statute of 1861.
There seems, upon reflection, to be one distinction between the two
estates and their incidents, that has some bearing upon the question under consideration. Although the estate of a married woman
under a settlement for her separate use, was recognised and maintained in equity with the incidents of ownership, yet the commonlaw marital rights of the husband co-existed. At law the being of
the wife became by the marriage incorporated into, and consolidated with, that of the husband, who had the absolute right to all
her personal property in possession, to her choses in action reduced
to possession during his life, and to the rents, issues and profits of
her real estate. This being the legal aspect of the relation, she of
course could seek no remedy for deprivation of equitable rights except in a court of equity, and no controversy could arise in that
forum between husband and wife in respect to the separate estate
of the latter without involving more or less conflict between the
legal rights of the husband and the equitable right of the wife, the
latter being without efficiency except in so far as they controlled
and held in subserviency the husband's legal rights.
But where the wife has a separate estate within the purview of
the statute, the case is entirely different. There, as between her and
her husband, she holds an absolute legal estate, if that would be
the character of it in a feme sole. No question as to subordination
to the commen-law rights of the husband can arise. For, back.
ward as may be courts or the profession to recognise the situation,
those rights are by the statute swept away and gone. She is entitled
to own, hold, possess and enjoy such estate precisely as if she were
sole and unmarried; as to such estate and her relations thereto,
she has no husband ; he is as a stranger even during the coverture.
Now it seems to us that when the question arises, whether by the
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fact of their living together as husband and wife and their dealings,
he receiving the income of her estate, she has not so consented as
to preclude her from ever recalling it, the distinction we have attempted to point out becomes essential ; the status of the parties
in the two cases being so materially different.
In the case of the receipt by the husband of the wife's income
from an equitable estate, and where the husband's common-law
rights still existed, the inquiry need go little beyond the mere
question whether it being competent for her to do so, she had not
waived her equitable rights in favor of her husband's legal rights;
such a waiving, relinquishment, or whatever we choose to call it,
being inferred from rather slight circumstances. The case of Caton v. Ridout, above cited, goes upon the principle, that a direction by the wife that he separate income which she would otherwise be entitled to should be received by the husband, would amount
to consent on her part that he might receive it, and if he once got
it into his hands with her consent, then it became his money, and
she could never recall it. The fact of the direction to receive it
might also be inferred from circumstances, the principal one of
which was that the parties were living together as husband and
wife. The rule is thus stated by an American author: "If the husband and wife live together and the husband recives from the
trustees the income of the wife's separate estate, the wife or her representatives cannot claim to recover from the husband or his estate,
more than one year's income. Whether one year's income can be
recovered or not is a matter of great conflict of opinion in England. There are many cases which hold that one year's income
can be recovered, and as many that it cannot. Mr. Lewis says,
that the better opinion is, independent of authority, that the wife
can recover nothing; and he pertinently asks if she could recover
anything of the trustees on the ground of a misapplication of the
income. The principle is, that the court presumes the consent of
the wife to the husband's receipt de anne in annum, and the wife's
assent is presumed to continue until revoked by something expressed or implied :" Perry on Trusts, sect. 665.
It is readily perceived why the receipt by the husband under the
circumstances ought to be held a discharge of the trustees; but the
rule that the mere fact of the husband getting the wife's separate
income into his possession with her presumed consent, made it his
property, and she could never recall it, necessarily springs from.
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the husband's co-existing common-law rights, because in other rela-.
tions, the one receiving it by direction of the person to whom it
was payable, would, in the absence of proof showing a contrary
purpose, be regarded as the mere agent and hold it for the true
owner. Where the estate is a mere equitable one, and a contest
arises between the wife and her husband in regard to the income of
such estate received by him, the question necessarily involves more
orless of conflict between the principles of equity and those of the
common-law pertaining to the relation of husband and wife. Such
has been the force of the common law, that in the results of all
such contests, they have borne some indelible impressions of its
unbending rigor.
But, as before said, when similar questions arise between husband
and wife, and her estate is under the statute, the common-law
rights of the husband in respect to the property of the wife can
have no influence whatever, simply because the statute has abrogated them. The relations of the parties may be considered with
reference to the weight to be given or inference drawn from their
conduct and dealings with regard to her separate property. In
the determination of a claim of a wife upon the husband, like that
here involved, it is indispensable for the judicial mind to become
fully consciout of the change wrought by the statute, and that busband and wife, as respects her separate estate, stand before the law
as strangers. Hence she may, as has been repeatedly decided by
this court, make her husband her agent to collect debts due her ;
to receive from others the income of her estate, and to magage and
control it, in her name ; and under this principle his dealings with
it will be presumptively in the character of agent. His receipt of
proceeds and income with her consent will be in that character and
for her, and they will not, in deference to marital legal rights,
thereby become his property. If the husband claim such .income
as a gift or other legal transfer thereof by the wife to him, the
burden is upon him to establish his claim by .evidence. In no
other mode of treating this subject can the intent and purpose of
the statute be carried into effect.
Under the doctrines here enunciated, and which we have endeavored to establish upon principle and reason, the plaintiff in
error has failed to satisfy us that his wife ever intended to vest
him with her income which came into his hands principally with
her assent. His conduct is consistent alone with the theory that
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he acted as her agent, and as such received the moneys in question.
She testifies to his promise to repay her, and he does not deny it.
He says as a witness that he made out nearly monthly accounts
for her, and when called upon, after she had withdrawn the business
from him to make out a final account he readily acquiesced, made
and presented one. They have both fully recognised the relation
of principal and agent. He by his acts, she by bringing this suit
and charging him as such. Such being the case, he, like other
agents, is entitled in the absence of special contract to reasonable
compensation for services within the agency and on behalf of such
separate estate. This claim the court below refused to recognise.
We think that was error. The decree of the court below is reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to refer the matters
of account to a master, and for further proceedings not inconsistent
with ihis opinion.
The rules of the common law which
ignored the civil existence of the wife
and merged it with all her rights in
thAt of the husband, are fast being superseded in the American states by
legislation, and judicial decisions based
thereon. From the first legislation,
the tendency has been in the direction
of the entire emancipation of the wife
from the control of the husband as to
her separate estate-to make marriage
no longer operate upon the property
but only upon the person.
Whatever may be thought of the policy of establishing this doctrine, the
course of legislation and decision teach
us that such a consummation is inevitable sooner or later everywhere in this
country ; the sooner therefore it becomes
established, the sooner we shall be relieved of many of the perplexing questions which must arise, and from the
uncertainty which must constantly be
felt, wherever only partial property
rights are accorded by the statute to the
wife, leaving an open field for contest
between the equitable rights of the wife
in her separate estate upon the one hand,
and the common-law rights of the husband therein, upon the other.
The statute of Illinois under which
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the principal case was decided in substance provides, that all the separate
property of the wife owned by her at
the time of the marriage, whether real
or personal, together with that which
she may acquire in good faith, during
coverture from any person other than
her husband, shall be and remain during coverture her sole and separate
property, and be held, owned, possessed
and enjoyed by her the same as though
she were sole and unmarried, and not
be subject to the disposal, control or
interference of her husband, nor be liable for his debts. This statute may be
regarded as indicating the general
scope of state legislation in this country
wuith reference to making the separate
property of the wife a legal estate and
placing the enjoyment of it wholly beyond control of the husband.
Regarding the separate property of
the wife as a legal estate, and considering that henceforth it is so to be treated,
much of the equity learning pertaining
to the separate estates of married women
has become ohsolete.
The cases cited below illustrate the
doctrine of the principal case, and indicate the current of modern decisions
upon this subject.
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In Illinois the court had previously
held that under the statute cited, a
married woman may institute and prosecute a suit for the recovery of her separate property even against her husband,
should he unlawfully interfere with it :
Emerson v. Clayton, 32 Ill. 493 ; Cookson v. Toole, 59 Id. 515. So in Pennsylvania: Cumning's Appeal, 11 Penna.
St. 275 ; Goodyear v. Ruiboumgh, 13 Id.
480 (although the general language in
both these eases must e taken with
caution, having been greatly modified
by subsequent decisions). Also in MisMissouri : King v. Mlittalberger, 50 Mo.
182 ; Meyers v. VIan Wagoner, 56 Id.
115.
In New York a married woman is at
liberty to avail herself of the agency of
her husband in the management of her
estate, with the same effect as if they
were not united in marriage : Owen v.
Cowly, 36 N. Y. 600; Voorhes v. Bonesteel, 16 Wallace 32.
And it has there been held that the
marriage of a female mortgagee with
the mortgagor does not extinguish her
right of action upon the mortgage:
Power v. Lester, 23 N. Y. 527.
Also that an action may be maintained by the wife against the husband
for appropriating to his use her money
obtained without her consent: Whitney
v. Whitney, 49 Barbour 319.
So an action may be sustained upon
a promissory note given to the wife by
the husband before marriage : lVright
And it
v. WVright, 54 N. Y. 437.
would seem to le settled there, that a
married woman may sue her husband
'to enforce any right affecting her separate property in any form of action, and
in the same manner that she might sue
any stranger.
In Indiana a judgment obtained by
the wife against tie husband belore the
marriage remains the separate property
of the wife, and she may enforce its

payment by execution after the marriage: Fleaner v. Flenner, 29 Ind. 565.
Nor will such a juigment be held void
in Pennsylvania because of the legal
unity of the parties : Williams' Appeal,
47 Penna. St. 307.
Such judgments cannot be collaterally
assailed on any other ground than crime,
malice or fraud to the injury of the
creditors of the judgment debtor : Sunmons v. Thomas, 43 Miss. 31.
In Kansas and Iowa, promissory
notes executed by the husband to the
wife, for mouey borrowed of and belonging to her separate estate, are valid
and binding upon the husband, and may
be enforced by the wife against him:
Logan v. Hall,19 Iowa 491 ; Jfonroe v.
May, 9 Kansas 466.
While the statutes we are considering
have undoubtedly abrogated the coinmon-law rule that the wife could not
give an estate to the husband, nor the
husband to the wife, based upon the
idea of their being one person, yet now,
where a gift between them is insisted
upon, it is not a matter of presumption
but it must be established like any
other fact by proof: Bachman v. Xillinger, 55 Penna. St. 414; Berqeyfs
Appeal, 60 Id. 408 ; Young's Estate, 65
Id. 101 ; Campbell v. Campbell, 21
Mich. 438.
In the principal case the liability of
the husband to pay interest is not discussed, but upon this point it has been
held that where the husband ues his
wife's money with her consent for the
benefit of the family, without any agreement on his part to pay interest, lie will
not as a general rule be liable therefor ;
but if lie receives the money for her use
and appropriates it to his own use without her permission, he will be liable to
pay interest: i1fellinger's Admr. v.
f3ausman's Trustee, 45 Penna. St. 522;

May v. May, 62 Id. 206.
C. H. W.
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WEEKS v. BILLINGS

AND

TRUSTEE.

An action brought by a citizen of New Hampshire against another citizen of the
same state, as principal defendant, and a corporation organized under a charter
granted by the legislature of another state, and having its principal place of business in such other state, as trustee, in a court of New Hampshire, cannot be
removed as to such trustee to the Circuit Court of the United States for the distilict of New Hampshire upon the petition of such corporation.
Section 639 of the Revised Statutes of the United States does not apply to such
an action.

Tais was an action against Billings-as defendant and the .Etna
Insurance Company as trustee. The latter filed a petition to
remove the cause to the Federal court, as follows : "The ,Etna
Insurance Company, trustee defendant in the above suit, respectfully represents, that it is a corporation duly organized under the
laws of the state of Connecticut, having its principal place of
business inHartford, in said state of Connecticut, and that it is
a' citizen of the state of Connecticut; that the plaintiff, William
B. Weeks, and the principal defendant, Henry S. Billings, are
represented in the writ as citizens of and residents in the state of
New Hampshire, which representation your petitioner believes to
be true ; that the amount in controversy in said suit exceeds the
sum of five hundred dollars, exclusive of costs, to wit, the sum of
four thousand dollars; that the final determination of the controversy between the plaintiff and your petitioner can be had without
the presence in court of the principal defendant: Wherefore your
petitioner prays that the cause, as against him, may be removed
to the next Circuit Court of the United States for the district of
New Hampshire, for trial and final determination." Signed by
the president of the corporation, and verified by oath.
Also, a sufficient bond in the sum of one thousand dollars, to
enter and prosecute said suit, &c., in the Federal court. But no
other paper was filed or presented to the court. The plaintiff and"
principal defendant both object to the removal of the cause.
The questions arising on said petition were transferred to this
court.

S. . Eastman, for the trustee, cited 14 Stat. at Large of U. S.
306 (Act of 1866); Case of the Sewin q Machine Companies, 18
Wall. 578; Wallace v. Blanchard, 3 N. H. 398; ikngraham v.
Alcock, 14 N. H. 243; Morrison v. Baker, 50 N. H. 529.
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Bingham
n. Mitchell, for the plaintiff, cited Gen. Stats., ch. 2.30,
sect. 40, and sect. 2; Acts of Congress, July 27th 1866, and
March 2d 1867; Hubbard v. Northern railroad,25 Vt. 715, and
3 Blatchf. 84; New Orleans v. Winters, 1 Wheat. 91; Strawbridge v. Cur-tis, 3 Oranch 267; Beardsley v. Torry, 4 Wash.
C. 0. 286; Ward v. Horendo, 1 Paine C. 0. 410; WIilson v.
Blodgett, 4 McLean 363; Bank v. Slocumb, 14 Pet. 60 ; 2 Abbott's U. S. Practice 38; Hatch v. Bailroad,6 Blatchf. C. C. 105.
SMITH, J.-Prior to the enactment by Congress, in June 1874,
of the Revised Statutes of. the United States, there were three
different statutes providing for the removal of actions from a state
court to the Circuit Court of the United States: the first was the
Judiciary Act (so-called) of 1789, and is substantially the same as
the first clause of sect. 639 of the Revised $tatutes; the second
was the Removal Act of July 27th 1866, which is substantially
the same as the second clause of said section; and the third was
the Act of larch 2d 1867, expressed in the title to be in amendment of the Act of 1866, and is substantially the same as the
third clause of said section.
At the argument it was claimed that this petition was brought
under the Act of 1866, and not under the Act of 1867, which
required an affidavit of want.of confidence to be filed; also, that
all the defendants be citizens of a different state from that of the
plaintiff. See Case of the Sewing Machine Companies, 18 Wall.
587, decided October Term 1873.
The several Acts of 1789, 1866 and 1867, although in force at
the time this suit was brought and first entered in court, having
been repealed by the enactment of the Revised Statutes of 1874,
we are to look to those statutes for the rules that now govern the
removal of suits from the state to the Federal courts. The second
clause of sect. 639 of those statutes is as follows :"Second. When the suit is against an alien and a citizen of the state where it
is brought, or is by a citizen of such state against a citizen of the same and a
citizen of another state, it may be so removed as against said alien or citizen of
another state, upon the petition of such defendant, filed at any time before the
trial or final hearing of the cause, if, so far as relates to him, it is brought for the
purpose of restraining or enjoining him.. or is a suit in which there can be a final
determination of the controversy, so far as concerns him, without the presence of
the other defendants as parties in the cause. But such removal shall not take
away or prejudice the right of the plaintiff to proceed at the same time with the
suit in the state court, as against the other defendants."
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The only question for our consideration is, whether the trustee
is a defendant in the sense in which the word is used in this statute ; and if so, whether the principal defendant and trustee can
be severed so that the cause may proceed in the state court against
the former, and in the Federal court against the latter ; and it is
quite clear this cannot be done. Although the trustee may in
some sense be regarded as a defendant, and the question of his
liability be tried by a jury or by the court, he has, nevertheless,
never been regarded by the courts as a defendant in the proper
and usual sense of the term, and in common parlance is known
and called by the name of trustee, while his alleged creditor is
called the principal defendant. They are not sued in the same
right, and are not answerable tothe plaintiff in the same manner.
The principal is sued on account of some alleged injury which
the plaintiff has sustained by his act or neglect. But as between
the plaintiff and trustee there is no privity of contract, or other
act or neglect by which the plaintiff has sustained damage. The
property and credits of the principal defendant in his hands are
attached, and he is summoned to show cause why execution should
not issue against him for the damage which the plaintiff may
recover against the principal defendant. The process as to him is
rather to be regarded as an attachment of the defendant's property
in his hands ; and even if this were an action in which the state
and Federal courts had original concurrent jurisdiction of the funds
of the defendant in the hands of the trustee, the state court being
the one before whom proceedings were first had and whose jurisdiction first attached, would retain its jurisdiction to the exclusion
of the other court, if the only controversy were as to the disposition of the funds so attached: Stearns v. Stearns, 16 Mass. 171.
In all cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the court which first has
possession of the subject-matter must determine it exclusively:
Smith v. Mclver, 9 Wheat. 532; Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. 583;
Shelby v. Bacon, 10 Id. 56.
The only ground upon 'which execution can issue against the
trustee is, that the plaintiff shall first establish his claim and obtain
judgment against the principal defendant. Failing to do this,
there is nothing left of the action, and it necessarily abates both
as to the defendant and the trustee
But if it be conceded that the trustee is a defendant in the sense
intended in the statute above quoted, it is plain this case does not
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come within that provision of the statute which requires that the
case must be such that there can be a final determination of the
controversy so far as concerns him without the presence of the
other defendants as parties in the cause, and that the removal
shall not prejudice the plaintiff's right to proceed at the same
time with the suit in the state court as against the other defendants. Suppose this petition were granted, and the action removed,
as to the trustee, to the Federal court: what could that court then
do with it ? The parties there would be the plaintiff and trustee,
but no principal defendant. Suppose that court should find the
trustee chargeable : what sort of judgment could it render ? How
could it know whether the plaintiff would be entitled to an execution against the trustee in the *absence of the principal defendant as a party? How would it know whether the plaintiff has
any claim whatever against the principal ? The principal not
being in court, no judgment can be rendered against him in the
Federal court, and that court cannot be supposed to know or
inquire what judgment, if any, the state.court had rendered against
him. It is absurd to say the judgment of the state court may be
certified to the Federal court so as to lay the foundation of a judgment in that court against the trustee, or that the judgment of the
Federal court may be certified back to the state court for final execution. There is no provision of the statute for any such proceedings, and no such proceeding was ever heard of. The severance of the parties, if once made, is final, and is fatal to the
further existence of the suit against the trustee. The Federal
and state courts are as distinct as the courts of this and another
state, or of this state and a foreign country, and there cannot,
from the very nature of their organization under different jurisdictions, be any such certifying backwards and forwards of their
judgments and proceedings.
The simple statement of the position in which this action would
be placed if this petition were granted is sufficient to show the
utter impracticability of the proposition.
CUSHING, 0. J.-The trustee process is a proceeding under the
statute law of New Hampshire. It is required by it that the
trustee should remain in court until judgment can be rendered
against the debtor, or, as he is called in the statute, the defendant.
By Gen. Stats., ch. 230, sect. 40, "When judgment is recovered
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by the plaintiff against the defendant, execution in favor of the
plaintiff may be issued against the trustee for the amount for
which he is adjudged chargeable, as for his own debt, not exceeding the amount of said judgment against the defendant, and against
the defendant for any balance." There is no provision by which
the proceeding can be brought to a close, unless the trustee and
the defendant are in the same court: Best, v. Flanders& Trustee,
16 N. H. 218. The conditions of the statute under which this
suit is sought to be removed cannot be fulfilled, and therefore my
opinion is that the action against the trustee cannot be transferred.
LADD, J., concurred.

Petition denied.
Supreme Judicial Court of New Hampshire.
LAIRD v. CONN. & PASS. RIVERS RAILROAD.
In August 1872, the plaintiff, a citizen of New Hampshire, commenced a suit
against the defendants, a Vermont corporation, which was entered at the September Term of the Supreme Judicial Court. In March 1874, the plaintiff, in good
faith, removed to and became a citizen of Vermont. At the September Term,
1874, the defendants filed a petition, &c., for the removal of the cause to the Circuit Court of the United States for New Hampshire under the Act of March 1867.
Hdd, that, inasmuch as both parties were citizens of the same state at the time the
petition was commenced, there was no right then in existence under the Constitution of the United States upon which jurisdiction in the Federal court could be
based, and the petition must therefore be denied.
CASE, for setting fire to and burning the plaintiff's property.
The defendants are a Vermont corporation. At the time the suit
was brought (August 17th 1872), the plaintiff was a citizen of New
Hampshire, and was so set up in the writ. About the last of
March 1874, the plaintiff removed to St. Johnsbury in Vermont,
in good faith, where he took up his permanent abode with his
family, with no intention of returning to New Hampshire. On the
first day of September Term 1874, the defendants' counsel announced their intention to move that the cause be removed to the
Federal court, under the Act of March 2d 1867; but the papers
were not then in readiness to be filed. Subsequently the plaintiff
filed the following motion in writing entitled of the term: "And
now, on the second day of said term, the plaintiff moves that in all
future orders made and processes issued in said case the said plaintiff may be described as set up as of St. Johnsbury, in the county
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of Caledonia and state of Vermont." The defendants filed an affidavit and bond in due form as reqiired by law, and moved that
the cause be removed to the Federal court under the Act of March
1867.
The defendants' counsel denied all knowledge by the corporation
that the plaintiff had removed to Vermont since the commencement
of the suit. The -plaintiff's counsel claimed that the corporation
had such knowledge, but there was no evidence one way or the
other except the claims of counsel as aforesaid.
The questions arising on the foregoing statement and motions
were transferred to this court for determination by LADD, J.
Geo. A. Bingham. (with whom were Burke of Vermont, and
Spring), for the defendants, cited Morgan v. Morgan, 2 Wheat.
290; Dunn v. Clarke, 8 Pet. 1; Clarke v. Matthewson. 12 Pet.
164 ; United States v. LKIers, 2 Brock. 516 ; Green v. Custard,
23 How. 484; Hatch v. Dorr, 4 McLean 112; Thazer v. Hatch,
6 Id. 68; 1 Abbott's U. S. Prac. 212; Kanouse v. Martin, 15
How. 198.
Carpenter (with whom was i. Bingham), for the plaintiff, cited
Huff v. Hutchin.son, 14 How. 586 ; McNutt v. Bland, 2 How. 9 ;
Dwar. on St. 563-565; Mollan v. Torrance, 9 Wheat. 537 ; Dunn
v. Clarke, 8 Pet. 1; Morgan v. Morgan, 2 Wheat. 296; Smith v.
Kernochen, 7 How. 198.
J.-The fact of the plaintiff's removal to Vermont in
good faith, six months before the bringing of this petition, was established in the court below by the admission of the parties. The
plaintiff desired to have that fact adjudicated in some way, in order
that upon error to the judgment of this court in the Supreme Court
of the United States it might appear as part of the record; and
the motion incorporated in the case was made with that view. Undoubtedly the fact of the plaintiff's removal to Vermont must in
some way appear at the hearing on error, otherwise the question
we are to decide will not be before the Supreme Court at all. But
it seems unnecessary to consider this very unusual motion, because,
as error must be brought to the judgment of this court, the record
must show the facts upon which our present decision is based, as
they appear in the statement sent here by the Circuit Court.
I am of opinion that the petition to remove the cause to the
Federal court should be denied; and I base my judgment on the
LADD,
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broad reason that by the Constitution of the United States the
Federal- court had, and could have, no jurisdiction of the parties
or the cause at the time the motion was made.
Under the Judiciary Act of 1789 the right to remove was confined to defendants, and the application must be made at the first
term. It was then thought to be wise and just that the plaintiff,
by bringing suit in the state court, should be held to have made
his election in what tribunal to proceed, and to have thereby
waived his constitutional right to sue in the Federal court ; while
the defendant, by omitting to apply for a removal at the first term,
should be held in the same way to have waived his constitutional
right to have the controversy settled in a different tribunal. Whatever doubts may have been entertained as to the constitutionality
of the Acts of 1866 and 1867, whereby this long established course
of practice was interrupted and changed, those doubts are now to
be regarded as settled in favor of the acts. But in interpreting
and administering those acts, which merely regulate the mode in
which a party may avail himself of his constitutional right in that
regard, no construction can be given them which shall have the
effect to create jurisdiction in the Federal courts, or in any way
impair or trench upon the jurisdiction of the several states. That
is matter entirely beyond legislative interference or control, always
to be determined by a just interpretation of the Constitution of
the United States. Congress may regulate the enjoyment of the
right, but the right itself rests upon the higher guaranties of the
Constitution.
Here was a suit commenced in August 1872, by a citizen of New
Hampshire against a citizen of Vermont. At the first term, September 1872, the defendants' right was absolute, under the Constitution and the Act of 1789, to have the cause removed to the
Federal court upon furnishing the securities thereby required: not
choosing to avail themselves of that absolute right, they still have
had a qualified right under the Act of 1867 to have the cause thus
removed, upon filing the affidavit required by that Act. Three
terms of the state court, separated by intervals of six months,
passed, and no application for removal was made. During all
this time there was a right, which rested upon the provisions of
the Constitution as to jurisdiction, because the parties were all the
time citizens of different states ; and this existing right was doubtless of such a character that its exercise might legally be regulated
VoL. XXIII.-94
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by Act of Congress. But then the plaintiff moved into and became a citizen of the same state with the defendants. What is
there any longer to uphold the right? The controversy is not
now between citizens of different states, but between citizens of
the same state. The right was not exercised while it was in existence by virtue of the Constitution which alone created it. Jurisdiction was nevek vested in any Federal court. Any different
conclusion, drawn from an inspection of the record or a consideration of the state of things existing at the time the suit was commenced, seems to me to rest on ground quite too narrow: an
important constitutional right is hardly to be determined by
technicalities. If the right had been exercised before the very
condition upon which its existence depended was destroyed, and
the plaintiff had afterwards removed td Vermont, an entirely
different question would be presented. In that case, there would
be a foundation for the jurisdiction of the Federal court ; and when
that jurisdiction has once attached, it clearly cannot be ousted by
the subsequent act of either party. . The trouble here is, the
jurisdiction never attached, and no move was made in the direction
of establishing it until the right upon which it must be based was
gone.
I have looked into all the cases decided by the Supreme Court of
the United States, supposed to bear upon this question, to which
our attention has been called by counsel, but have not been able to
find anything which, in my judgment, can be regarded as in conflict with these views. Kanouse v. Martin, 15 How. 198, is clearly
and broadly distinguishable from the present case by the fact
that the amendment reducing the amount claimed below five
hundred dollars was allowed after the motion t6 remove had been
made and the power of the state court over the cause was at an end.
CUSHING,

C. J., concurred.

SMITH, J.-The only question before us is, whether this is a
suit "between a citizen of the state in which it is brought and a
citizen of another state." It was such a suit at the time it was
brought and entered in court, and so continued up to March 1874;
and the case sent up to us from the court below shows that since
March 1874 neither party has been a citizen of this state in which
the suit was brought.
The right of removal depends upon the citizenship of the parties,
-but whether at the time the suit was brought or at the time the
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petition for removal was filed, is the question presented for determrination.
It was in the power of the defendants to remove this suit into
the Federal court upon petition filed before the removal of the
plaintiff into Vermont. This privilege they did not see fit to avail
themselves of. The state court had jurisdiction of the case up to
that time, liable, however, to be divested by removal of the cause
to the Federal c6urt. After the removal of Laird, from the state,
the action ceased to be any longer a suit "between a citizen of
the .state in which it was brought and a citizen of another state,"
but became a suit between citizens of the same state.
It has been repeatedly settled in the Supreme Court of the
United States', that when the jurisdiction of the Federal court has
once attached, it cannot be divested by a.change in the citizenship
of the parties: Wlallace v. Torrance, 9 Wheat. 537 ; 3lorgav. v.
Morgan, 2 Wheat. 290; Dunn v. Clarke, 8 Pet. 1; Clarke v.
Hatthewson, 12 Pet. 170; Greene v. Custard, 23 How. 484;
Kanouse v. Martin, 15 How. 207.
If this suit had been removed to the United States Circuit Court
before the removal of the plaintiff to Vermont, the jurisdiction of
that court having once attached to the suit could not have been
affected or divested by such removal of the plaintiff. The state
court :has had jurisdiction of this case since the commencement of
the-,suit, liable to be defeated as long as the parties remained citizens of the respective states in which they had their domicile at
the time the suit was commenced ; but no steps having been taken
to divest the state court of jurisdiction by removal to the Federal
court when it was in the power of the defendants so to do, it cannot be divested of its jurisdiction when the condition of citizenship
upon which such right of removal is grounded no longer exists.
It will hardly be contended that where a suit is commenced in a
state court between citizens of the same state, the defendant, if the
plaintiff should remove into another state, would acquire the right
to remove the cause into the Federal court, because, upon the
strength of the above decisions, the state court cannot be ousted
of its jurisdiction when it has once attached.
Upon the same ground I think this petition must be denied, to
wit, that the cause not having been removed while the parties were
citizens of different states, the jurisdiction of the state court became unalterably attached when the parties became citizens of the
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same state, and there no longer existed the ground for removal
provided by the statute. I know of no practice of the court to
authorize the granting of-the plaintiff's motion, to be hereafter described in the future orders and processes issued in this case as of
St. Johnsbury, Vermont. Although I see no particular objection
to it, I see no necessity for granting the motion.
Petition denied.

Supreme Court of Oregon.
J. N. DOLPII r. IIARLOW BARNEY.
Where the certificate of an officer to acknowledgment of a deed, appears on its
face to be in substantial compliance with the statute, parol evidence to impeach it
is inadmissible, unless there are allegations in the pleadings to warrant it.
The law presumes that a person acting in a public office was regularly appointed to it, and also that official duty has been regularly performed.

EJECTMEXT. At the trial plaintiff deduced his title through a
patent from the United States to one John Waymire, then by a deed
from Waymire and Clarissa his -wife to M. S. Riggs and thence
by sundry mesne conveyances to himself. Defendant offered to
introduce evidence tending to show that Clarissa Waymire did -not
sign the same freely and voluntarily, and that she did not acknowledge the same separate and apart from her husband. The respondent's counsel objected, and the court sustained the objection, which
ruling is charged as error.
P. C. Sullivan, R. P. Boise and Daly 4&Myers, for appellant,
cited 4 John. 161, 469; 12 Id. 469; 1 Id. 498; 2 Wend. 308;
10 Minn. 427; 18 Md. 305; 23 Cal. 259; 2 Phil. Ev. 587, 590,
591; 1 Greenl. Ev. 289; 3 Washburn 192.
E. C. Bronaugh and W W. Thayer, for respondent, cited 1
Oregon 17 ; 8 Wall. 109 ; 65 N. C. 619; 42 Ill. 518; 18 Iowa 90.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MCARTHUR, J.'-That a deed may be set aside or the enforcement of it,- terms successfully resisted on the ground of fraud or
imposition, when the deed is itself the subject of litigation in a
I Several other questions were argued and decided in this case, but they are
omitted as of merely local interest,-ED. AM. LAW REo.
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court of equity, is a well settled and a familiar principle. But in
an action of ejectment we are of opinion that no evidence should
be received to invalidate an acknowledgment of a deed, when such
acknowledgment meets the requirements of the statute. The certificate of acknowledgment to the deed of John Waymire and
Clarissa his wife to Riggs, comes up with the bill of exceptions,
and an inspection thereof shows that it conforms to the statute.
In all such cases the deed may be read in evidence without further
proof thereof. (General Laws, p. 518, sect. 22.)
We have examined the autholities relied upon by appellant's
counsel. Some of them seem to support the position taken, but
most of them will, upon examination be found to be cases where
the evidence offered was designed to supply proof of facts necessary
to give validity to the acknowledgment. With these we have nothing to do, the'others we will proceed to examine.
The case of Jackson v. Hfumphrey, 1 John. 497, was an action
of ejectment tried in 1806. The principal point in controversy
was in relation to the admission of certain testimony, tending to
show that the judge, before whom the proof of the execution of a
certain deed was taken, was at the time of taking the same, out
of the jurisdiction of the state. The. testimony was declared admissible. The report of the case is very meager, and the opinion
is not so apparently well considered as to be ranked as an approved
precedent.
Jackson v. Scltoonmaker, 4 John. 160, was an action of ejectment tried in 1809. A deed was introduced and its admission objected to, because there was no evidence of possession accompanying it, and therefore not to be received as an ancient deed.
An offer was also made to show that one of the grantors was non
compos mentis at the time of the acknowledgment. The court
held that the certificate of the proof or acknowledgment of a deed
taken before a judge is not conclusive, but the party affected by
the deed may contest its validity, and the force and effect of the
formal proof.
Jackson v. Hayner and Jackson v. Perguson, 12 John. 468,
were actions of ejectment tried in 1815. The title of both parties
was derived from the same source. The question in these cases
was whether a certain assignment endorsed on a certain lease was
fraudulent and void. The point decided was, that where an illiterate man is induced to sign a deed by a misrepresentation of its
nature and contents, the deed is void.
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Jackson v. Perkins, 2 Wend. 304, was an action of cjectment
tried in 1829. The material question was as to the delivery of
the deed. The only evidence of its delivery was the proof of its
cxecution, by one of the subscribing witnesses before a master in
chancery for the purpose of putting it upon record. Among other
things, the court declared that proof or acknowledgment, is ex
parte, and any person who may be affected by the deed, may at
any time, question its validity, and show that in fact it was duly
executed or delivered. 'The cases in 4 and 12 Johnson, supra,
are cited in support of this position.
These cases were all tried under the general issue, and as near
as can be ascertained, under a statute which declared, that "neither
the certificate of acknowledgment, or of proof, nor the record, is
conclusive; but may be rebutted, and the force and effect thereof,
contested by any party affected thereby. If the contestant shows
that the proof was taken on the oath of an interested or incompetent witness, neither the conveyance nor record can be received
in evidence until established by other competent proof:" (1 Rev.
Stat. 759, sect. 17.) We have been unable to find any cases in
New York, since adoption of the code, holding the doctrine of the
cases just noticed.
-Edgerton v. Jones, 10 Minn. 427, is not in point. That was
an action brought by the plaintiff against A. B. Jones, Mary M.
Jones, his wife, and others, to foreclose a mortgage purporting to
be executed by defendants, A. B. and Mary M. Jones. The only
issues made in the pleadings material to the points decided, are in
regard to the execution and acknowledgment of the mortgage
by defendant, Mary M. Jones. The cause was tried by a referee,
who admitted parol testimony, to contradict the official certificate
of the acknowledgment of the mortgage. This the court held not
to be error. We presume that in a suit in equity, and upon issue
joined by the pleadings it would not be contended that evidence
tending to contradict a certificate of acknowledgment would not
be admissible. In the opinion in the case just cited, it is stated
that the question presented, was fully discussed and decided in
.Dodge v. Hfollingshead, 6 Minn. 25. That case has not been furnished us, and we have been unable to ascertain the length to
which it goes. It is evident, however, that the opinion did not
neet with the unqualified approval of the court in -Edgertonv.
Jones, for after referring to -Dodge v. Rollingshead, it is said,

